ABSTRACT In this survey we have investigated the experiences and attitudes of Danish physicians regarding end‐of life decisions. Most respondents have made decisions that involve hastening the death of a patient, and almost all find it acceptable to do so. Such decisions are made more often, and considered ethically more acceptable, with the informed consent of the patient than without. But both non‐resuscitation decisions, and decisions to provide pain relief in doses that will shorten the patient's life, have been made (...) and found acceptable by at least 50% of the respondents, even when there is no informed consent. Furthermore, 12% have doubled morphine dosages with fixed intervals, thus providing doses substantially higher than that necessary to control pain, without the informed consent of the patient. Two per cent have helped in assisted suicide, and 5% have administered a lethal injection at the patient's request. Respectively 37% and 34% find these last two practices ethically acceptable. Amongst those that do not find them acceptable, the most important reasons to be opposed are, the doctrine of double effect, the doctrine of doing and allowing, and the view that human life is sacred. Amongst supporters, the most important reasons mentioned are, that the patient's right to self‐determination should be respected, the view that a patient should not be forced to suffer, and the view that the patient has a right to be helped to a dignified death. (shrink)

In this survey we have investigated the experiences and attitudes of Danish physicians regarding end-of-life decisions. Most respondents have made decisions that involve hastening the death of a patient, and almost all find it acceptable to do so. Such decisions are made more often, and considered ethically more acceptable, with the informed consent of the patient than without. But both non-resuscitation decisions, and decisions to provide pain relief in doses that will shorten the patient's life, have been made and found (...) acceptable by at least 50% of the respondents, even when there is no informed consent. Furthermore, 12% have doubled morphine dosages with fixed intervals, thus providing doses substantially higher than that necessary to control pain, without the informed consent of the patient. Two per cent have helped in assisted suicide, and 5% have administered a lethal injection at the patient's request. Respectively 37% and 34% find these last two practices ethically acceptable. Amongst those that do not find them acceptable, the most important reasons to be opposed are, the doctrine of double effect, the doctrine of doing and allowing, and the view that human life is sacred. Amongst supporters, the most important reasons mentioned are, that the patient's right to self-determination should be respected, the view that a patient should not be forced to suffer, and the view that the patient has a right to be helped to a dignified death. (shrink)

It is widely held within contemporary metaethics that there is a lack of linguistic support for evaluative expressivism. On the contrary, it seems that the predictions that expressivists make about evaluative discourse are not borne out. An instance of this is the so-called problem of missing Moorean infelicity. Expressivists maintain that evaluative statements express non-cognitive states of mind in a similar manner to how ordinary descriptive language expresses beliefs. Conjoining an ordinary assertion that p with the denial of being in (...) the corresponding belief state famously gives rise to Moorean infelicity:?? It’s raining but I don’t believe that it’s raining. If expressivists are right, then conjoining evaluative statements with the denial of being in the relevant non-cognitive state of mind should give rise to similar infelicity. However, as several theorists have pointed out, this does not seem to be the case. Statements like the following are not infelicitous: Murder is wrong but I don’t disapprove of it. In this paper, I argue that evaluative statements express the kind of states that are attributed by ‘find’-constructions in English and that these states are non-cognitive in nature. This addresses the problem of missing Moorean infelicity and, more generally, goes to show that there are linguistic facts which support expressivism about evaluative discourse. (shrink)

Since weakly decaying particles are their own polarimeters, reactions like $\eta _c \to \Lambda \bar \Lambda , \psi \to \Lambda \bar \Lambda ,e^ + e^ - \to \mu ^ + \mu ^ -$ , etc. are interesting for testing the non-locality of quantum mechanical predictions. Although such reactions, in principle, do not exclude all classes of hidden variable theories, they can be used to complement current experiments with external polarimeters. The reaction $\eta _c \to \Lambda \bar \Lambda \to \pi ^ (...) - p\pi ^{ + - } \bar p$ is conceptually the simplest and most useful as agedanken experiment, although it has not yet been seen experimentally. The reaction $e^ + e^ - \to \Lambda \bar \Lambda \to \pi ^ - p\pi ^ + \bar p$ near threshold or at the φ resonance can be used for essentially the same test. This is feasible with presently available data and would be the first EPR experiment involving weak interactions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Vaiśeṣikasūtra – A Translation by Ionut Moise and Ganesh U. ThiteNils Seiler (bio)Vaiśeṣikasūtra – A Translation. By Ionut Moise and Ganesh U. Thite. London: Routledge, 2021. Pp. viii + 294. Paper $48.95, isbn 978-1-032005-90-4.Vaiśeṣikasūtra – A Translation by Ionut Moise and Ganesh U. Thite serves as an introduction to Vaiśeṣika thought and an introduction to the seventh-century commentary (vṛtti) on the Vaiśeṣikasūtra by Candrānanda. Their book is primarily (...) intended for non-specialists. As Moise notes, "The aim of this edition of Vaiśeṣikasūtra is, therefore, to introduce students of Western philosophy to some of the categories of Indian philosophy, and by way of this to demonstrate the necessity of conceptual correlation between Indian philosophy (particularly Vaiśeṣika) and the perennial and insoluble questions of today's World philosophy" (p. 6). Besides ShashiPrabha Kumar's Classical Vaiśeṣika in Indian Philosophy: On Knowing and What is to Be Known (2013) and the brief summaries included in surveys such as Raffaele Torella's The Philosophical Traditions of India: An Appraisal (2011), there is very little secondary literature in English that offers a general introduction to Vaiśeṣika thought, especially for non-specialists. Moise and Thite's work attempts to help fill this gap, but their work would have benefited from a longer, more descriptive introduction to Vaiśeṣika (à la Kumar and Torella). Primary literature in English on Vaiśeṣika is not much better. For example, as Moise and Thite note, only excerpts of Candrānanda's commentary have been translated into English. Thus, unlike Halbfass (1992), Nozawa (1993), and Thakur (2003) (p. ix), Moise and Thite offer the first complete translation of the earliest extant commentary on the Vaiśeṣikasūtra.The book is divided into three main parts: chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to Vaiśeṣika philosophy and a summary of Candrānanda's commentary, chapter 2 outlines the current state of manuscripts of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra and Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti, and chapter 3 contains a transliteration and translation of the Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti. The authors also include three appendices, two of which situate Vaiśeṣika philosophy within world philosophy and within its own commentarial tradition, and one of which outlines the extant manuscripts of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra and Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti.Moise uses chapter 1 to familiarize his philosophical audience with the tradition of Vaiśeṣika. He does this by drawing attention to the history of Greek and Indian thought, highlighting similarities between these traditions, and emphasizing the importance of naturalism, metaphysics, and ontology in both [End Page 1] traditions. Although it may seem an idiosyncratic way to introduce Indian philosophy, Moise uses the Greek tradition to build a foundation from which those unfamiliar with Indian thought may find a way into the tradition of Vaiśeṣika. This approach is more than pedagogical. Moise argues that his "preliminary survey on the Pre-Socratic Greek philosophy [sic] is important because of their conspicuous resemblance with the problems raised by the early Vedic and Upaniṣadic seers" (p. 2). The similarity between Greek and Vedic thought is essentially metaphysical, according to Moise. But there are also meaningful differences between the questions Greek and Indian thinkers pose and the answers they provide and attending to these differences can be philosophically fruitful. As Moise argues, "by matching unrelated systems of thought (Indian, Greek, analytic, and so forth), our knowledge rebuilds and reconstructs while the ontic definitions of the world gain more clarity than has ever been possible" (p. 6).According to Moise, Vaiśeṣika philosophy can challenge our metaphysical and ontological notions. Specifically, he argues that Vaiśeṣika ontology provides an alternative to the problematic dualism of matter and form in Aristotelian thought, as well as to the notions of essence and existence in the Medieval Scholastics (p. 4). Moise argues that disparate philosophical traditions can problematize and influence our understanding of philosophy: "In short, Indian philosophies begin, change, and challenge the scope of ontology" and... (shrink)

F. P. Ramsey was a remarkably creative and subtle philosopher who in the briefest of academic careers made significant contributions to logic, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of language and decision theory. His few published papers reveal him to be a figure or comparable importance to Russell, Carnap and Wittgenstein in the history of analytical philosophy. This book was the first critical study of Ramsey's work, offering a thorough exposition and interpretation of his ideas, setting the ideas in their historical context, (...) and assessing their significance for contemporary research. The study is intended to complement the reissue of Ramsey's papers edited by Professor Hugh Mellor. (shrink)

This paper is just a comment to the impressive work by A. C. Ehresmann and J.-P. Vanbremeersch on the theory of Memory Evolutive Systems (MES). MES are truly higher order systems. Hyperstructures represent a new concept which I introduced in order to capture the essence of what a higher order structure is—encompassing hierarchies and emergence. Hyperstructures are motivated by cobordism theory in topology and higher category theory. The morphism concept is replaced by the concept of a bond. In the paper (...) I briefly introduce hyperstructures motivated geometrically and suggest further developments of the MESs along these lines, which could widen up new areas of applications. (shrink)

This short paper has two loosely connected parts. In the first part, I discuss the difference between classical and intuitionist logic in relation to different the role of hypotheses play in each logic. Harmony is normally understood as a relation between two ways of manipulating formulas in systems of natural deduction: their introduction and elimination. I argue, however, that there is at least a third way of manipulating formulas, namely the discharge of assumption, and that the difference between classical and (...) intuitionist logic can be characterised as a difference of the conditions under which discharge is allowed. Harmony, as ordinarily understood, has nothing to say about discharge. This raises the question whether the notion of harmony can be suitably extended. This requires there to be a suitable fourth way of manipulating formulas that discharge can stand in harmony to. The question is whether there is such a notion: what might it be that stands to discharge of formulas as introduction stands to elimination? One that immediately comes to mind is the making of assumptions. I leave it as an open question for further research whether the notion of harmony can be fruitfully extended in the way suggested here. In the second part, I discuss bilateralism, which proposes a wholesale revision of what it is that is assumed and manipulated by rules of inference in deductions: rules apply to speech acts – assertions and denials – rather than propositions. I point out two problems for bilateralism. First, bilaterlists cannot, contrary to what they claim to be able to do, draw a distinction between the truth and assertibility of a proposition. Secondly, it is not clear what it means to assume an expression such as '+ A' that is supposed to stand for an assertion. Worse than that, it is plausible that making an assumption is a particular speech act, as argued by Dummett (Frege: Philosophy of Language, p.309ff). Bilaterlists accept that speech acts cannot be embedded in other speech acts. But then it is meaningless to assume + A or − A. (shrink)

This book offers a multidisciplinary collection of historiographical case studies which in various ways explore the question of the modes of interrelation between 'change' and 'continuity' in historical narratives in Western cultural history."--Introduction, p. [1].

ABSTRACTSolving a conflict between two response options in an interference task has been found to increase control in a subsequent conflict situation. The present research examined whether such conflict adaptation persists in the presence of distractors that have motivational relevance and are therefore competing for attentional resources. In an adjusted flanker task, motivational distractors were presented together with the current trial while the previous trial never included any distractor. Accumulated evidence across three studies showed that motivational distractors reduced the conflict (...) adaptation effect. This was found irrespective of the location at which the distractor occurred, and independent of its valence. Study 3 and a merged data analysis ruled out low-level alternative explanations. In line with a dual competition account (P... (shrink)

A ring is said to be clean if every element of the ring can be written as a sum of an idempotent element and a unit element of the ring and a ring is said to be nil-clean if every element of the ring can be written as a sum of an idempotent element and a nilpotent element of the ring. In this paper, we generalize these arguments to symbolic 2-plithogenic structure. We introduce the structure of clean and nil-clean symbolic (...) 2-plithogenic rings and some of its elementary properties are presented. Also, we have found the equivalence between classical clean(nil-clean) ring R and the corresponding symbolic 2-plithogenic ring 2-SPR. (shrink)

A review with commentary on the book, Understanding Beliefs, Nils J. Nilsson, MIT Press, 2014.

Some experiments are risky in that they cannot repeatedly produce certain phenomenon at will for study because the scientific knowledge of the process generating the uncertain phenomenon is poorly understood or may directly contradict with existing scientific knowledge. These experiments may have great impact not just to the scientific community but to mankind in general. Banning them from study may incur societies a great opportunity cost but accepting them runs the risk that scientists are doing junk science. How to make (...) an informed decision to accept/reject such study scientifically for the mainstream scientific community is of great importance to mankind. Here, we propose a statistical methodology to handle the situation. Specifically, we consider the likelihood of not observing the phenomenon after n trails so that it is statistically significant to have nil result. Consequently, we reject the hypothesis that there is some probability that we observe the phenomenon. (shrink)

This proceedings volume contains a selection of revised and extended papers presented at the Second International Workshop on Nonmonotonic and InductiveLogic, NIL '91, which took place at Reinhardsbrunn Castle, December 2-6, 1991. The volume opens with an extended version of a tutorial on nonmonotonic logic by G. Brewka, J. Dix, and K. Konolige. Fifteen selected papers follow, on a variety of topics. The majority of papers belong either to the area of nonmonotonic reasoning or to the field of inductive inference, (...) but some papers integrate research from both areas. The first workshop in this series was held at the University of Karlsruhe in December 1990 and its proceedings were published as Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence Volume 543. The series of workshops was made possible by financial support from Volkswagen Stiftung, Hannover. This workshop was also supported by IBM Deutschland GmbH and Siemens AG. (shrink)

This is a commentary on MM McCabe's "First Chop your logos... Socrates and the sophists on language, logic, and development". In her paper MM analyses Plato's Euthydemos, in which Plato tackles the problem of falsity in a way that takes into account the speaker and complements the Sophist's discussion of what is said. The dialogue looks as if it is merely a demonstration of the silly consequences of eristic combat. And so it is. But a main point of MM's paper (...) is that there is serious philosophy in the Euthydemos, too. MM argues that to counter the sophist brothers Euthydemos and Dionysodoros, Socrates points out that that there are different aspects to the verb 'to say' that run in parallel to the different aspects of the very 'to learn'. So just as there is continuity rather than ambiguity between 'to learn' and 'to understand', so there is continuity between the different aspects of saying. Thus Socrates puts forward a teleological account of both learning and meaning. Following up on some of MM's thoughts, I argue that the sophists subscribe, despite appearance, to a theory of meaning that respects serious and widely accepted philosophical theses on meaning. -/- Forthcoming in the Australasian Philosophical Review. The curator of the volume is Fiona Leigh, and the committee also has Hugh Benson and Tim Clarke. You can find MM's paper as well as the commentaries by Nicholas Denyer and Russell E. Jones and Ravi Sharma (and myself) by registering. (shrink)

If a work of literary fiction prescribes us to imagine that the Devil made a bet with God and transformed into a poodle, then that claim is true in the fiction and we imagine accordingly. Generally, we cooperate imaginatively with literary fictions, however bizarre, and the things authors write into their stories become true in the fiction. But for some claims, such as moral falsehoods, this seems not to be straightforwardly the case, which raises the question: Why not? The puzzles (...) such cases raise are sometimes grouped under the heading “imaginative resistance”. In this paper, I argue against what I take to be the best attempts to dismiss the puzzles and solve them. I also tease out subtleties not sufficiently addressed in the existing literature and end by defending a unified solution of my own. According to this solution, the puzzling phenomena occur when literary works offer inadequate and exhaustive grounds for claims. The solution’s novelty lies in its giving a normative rather than psychological or alethic explanation for the puzzling phenomena, the relevant norms being those of proper artistic appreciation. (shrink)

Within contemporary metaethics, it is widely held that there is a “presumption of realism” in moral thought and discourse. Anti-realist views, like error theory and expressivism, may have certain theoretical considerations speaking in their favor, but our pretheoretical stance with respect to morality clearly favors objectivist metaethical views. This article argues against this widely held view. It does so by drawing from recent discussions about so-called “subjective attitude verbs” in linguistics and philosophy of language. Unlike pretheoretically objective predicates (e.g., “is (...) made of wood”, “is 185 cm tall”), moral predicates embed felicitously under subjective attitude verbs like the English “find”. Moreover, it is argued that the widespread notion that moral discourse bears all the marks of fact-stating discourse is rooted in a blinkered focus on examples from English. Cross-linguistic considerations suggest that subjective attitude verbs are actually the default terms by which we ascribe moral views to people. Impressions to the contrary in English have to do with some unfortunate quirks of the term “think”. (shrink)

Some things that we take to be the case in a fictional work are never made explicit by the work itself. For instance, we assume that Sherlock Holmes does not have a third nostril, that he wears underpants and that he has never solved a case with a purple gnome, even though neither of these things is ever mentioned in the narration. This article argues that examples like these can be accounted for through the same content-enriching reasoning that we employ (...) when confronted with non-fictional discourse, with the important difference that fictional discourse essentially involves pretence. Fictional discourse works in much the same way as non-fictional discourse, and what is conveyed without being stated can accordingly be explained through familiar pragmatic mechanisms. It is argued that this account carries some distinct advantages over competing views. (shrink)

The right to health is enshrined in the constitution of the World Health Organization and numerous other international agreements. Yet today, an estimated 5.7 million people die each year from treatable infectious diseases, most of which are susceptible to existing antimicrobials if they were accessible. These deaths occur predominantly among populations living in poverty in low- and middle-income countries, and they greatly exceed the estimated 700,000 annual deaths worldwide currently attributed to antimicrobial resistance. Ensuring universal appropriate access to antimicrobials is (...) not only a critical part of realizing the right to health, it is necessary for mobilizing effective collective action against the development and spread of AMR. (shrink)

This paper considers proof-theoretic semantics for necessity within Dummett's and Prawitz's framework. Inspired by a system of Pfenning's and Davies's, the language of intuitionist logic is extended by a higher order operator which captures a notion of validity. A notion of relative necessary is defined in terms of it, which expresses a necessary connection between the assumptions and the conclusion of a deduction.

Kampf, Gewalt und Subjekt sind in der modernen Philosophie seit langem verbunden. Dies zeigt sich auch in anderen kulturellen Reflexionsräumen wie dem Boxkampf. Wenn Menschen kämpfen, lenken sie Aggression und Gewalt in regelgeleitete, gesellschaftskonforme Bahnen. Die Kontrahenten müssen sich gegenseitig anerkennen und machen sich selbst als eigenständige Subjekte anerkennbar. Das Buch diskutiert, inwiefern der Boxkampf als exemplarische Aufführung des Entstehens von Subjektivität in und durch einen Kampf in Bezug auf Hegel und Nietzsche verstanden werden kann. Bei beiden Denkern findet sich (...) eine agonale Essenz. Im Gegeneinander sollen Subjekte eigenständige Individuen werden. Zugleich gilt die Agonalität sozialen Lebens beiden als Grundlage sozialer Entwicklung. Die Idee der fundamentalen Bedeutung von Kämpfen entwickelt sich in der Philosophie des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts zu einem Leitgedanken, der auch über die Philosophie hinaus bedeutsam wird und im Boxkampf eine besondere Aufführungsform findet. (shrink)

A handful of scholars have connected objectification (treating people like objects) to personification (treating objects like people). The recurring idea is that personification may entail objectification and therefore share in the latter's ethical difficulties. This idea is defended by various feminist philosophers. They focus on how the connection manifests in the male, heterosexual consumption of pornography, grounding a constitutive ethical criticism of this pornography. In this paper, I schematize the only two arguments for this connection, showing why each fails. I (...) revise one of the arguments to overcome my objection before showing, most significantly, that any argument with the same form must fail. I conclude by suggesting that thinking about the ethics of the imagination offers a promising alternative approach that preserves the spirit of these failed arguments. (shrink)

Dahlbäck, Forsblad and Hydén argue that conversational remembering in the real‐world must be acknowledged as an interactional practice grounded in and bound to the communicative actions produced by the interlocutors. They illustrate the complexity of those processes by referring to their own fieldwork examining older adults’ prospective memory within their homes (Dahlbäck, Kristiansson, & Stjernberg, 2013) and propose alternative methodologies (e.g., scenarios design) to increase collaborations between ethnographic and experimental memory researchers.

Emergence is a universal phenomenon that can be defined mathematically in a very general way. This is useful for the study of scientifically legitimate explanations of complex systems, here defined as hyperstructures. A requirement is that the observation mechanisms are considered within the general framework. Two notions of emergence are defined, and specific examples of these are discussed.

Early modern medicine was much more dependent on the senses than its contemporary counterpart. Although a comprehensive medical theory existed that assigned great value to taste and odor of medicaments, historical descriptions of taste and odor appears imprecise and inconsistent to modern eyes. How did historical actors move from subjective experience of taste and odor to culturally stable agreements that facilitated communication about the sensory properties of medicaments? This paper addresses this question, not by investigating texts, but by going straight (...) to the sensory impression, which certain substances convey. The aim is not to overwrite or rectify historical descriptions but to investigate whether modern methodologies for sensory assessment can be enlisted to understand the past. We draw on history of science for framing and research questions, pharmaceutical science for knowledge of pharmaceuticals and preparations, and food and meal science for assaying procedures and protocols. We show that sensory evaluation can yield precise descriptions that would not have been alien to early modern medicine makers. However, there are problems with translating descriptions of taste between different historical contexts. By comparing contemporary descriptions of sensations with eighteenth‐century ones, the article discusses how sensory descriptions are highly dependent on context, and subject to historical change. (shrink)

Das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Einzelinteressen und kollektivem Handeln ist ein klassisches Phänomen der Politik. Die Beiträge des Bandes behandeln dieses Thema aus verschiedenen theoretischen und methodischen Perspektiven.

Inference to the best explanation (IBE) is the principle of inference according to which, when faced with a set of competing hypotheses, where each hypothesis is empirically adequate for explaining the phenomena, we should infer the truth of the hypothesis that best explains the phenomena. When our theories correctly display this principle, we call them our ‘best’. In this paper, I examine the explanatory role of mathematics in our best scientific theories. In particular, I will elucidate the enormous utility of (...) mathematical structures. I argue from a reformed indispensability argument that mathematical structures are explanatorily indispensable to our best scientific theories. Therefore, IBE scientific realism entails mathematical realism. I develop a naturalistic, neo-Quinean ontology, which grounds physical and mathematical entities in structures. Mathematical structures are the truthmakers for the entities of our quantificational discourse. I also develop an ‘ontic conception’ of explanation, according to which explanations exist in the world, whether or not we discover and model them. I apply the ontic account to mathematical structures, arguing that these structures are the explanations for particles, forces, and even the conservation laws of physics. As such, mathematical structures provide the fundamental grounding for ontological commitment. I conclude by reviewing the evidence from modern physics for the existence of mathematical structures. (shrink)

This contribution traces the parallel development of two distinct approaches to peasant agroecological education: the peasant-to-peasant horizontal method that disseminated across Mesoamerica and the Caribbean beginning in the 1970s, and the political-agroecological training schools of combined consciousness-building and skill-formation that have been at the heart of the educational processes of member organizations of La Via Campesina since the 1990s. Applying a theoretical framework that incorporates territorial struggle, agroecology and popular education, we examine spatial and organizational aspects of each of these (...) models for peasant education and movement-building. Recognizing that the models, their respective contexts, and the dialectical relationships therein have been in constant evolution, we share findings on the movement-place as a territorial system with socio-historical subjectivity, that is, peasant movements as territorially-embedded, collective historical actors. This leads to some conclusions in moving past educational theory that has centered upon individual subjects, and approaching a conception of territory as a subject of learning processes. (shrink)

The focus of this paper are Dummett's meaning-theoretical arguments against classical logic based on consideration about the meaning of negation. Using Dummettian principles, I shall outline three such arguments, of increasing strength, and show that they are unsuccessful by giving responses to each argument on behalf of the classical logician. What is crucial is that in responding to these arguments a classicist need not challenge any of the basic assumptions of Dummett's outlook on the theory of meaning. In particular, I (...) shall grant Dummett his general bias towards verificationism, encapsulated in the slogan 'meaning is use'. The second general assumption I see no need to question is Dummett's particular breed of molecularism. Some of Dummett's assumptions will have to be given up, if classical logic is to be vindicated in his meaning-theoretical framework. A major result of this paper will be that the meaning of negation cannot be defined by rules of inference in the Dummettian framework. (shrink)

ABSTRACTEvaluative aesthetic discourse communicates that the speaker has had first-hand experience of what is talked about. If you call a book bewitching, it will be assumed that you have read the book. If you say that a building is beautiful, it will be assumed that you have had some visual experience with it. According to an influential view, this is because knowledge is a norm for assertion, and aesthetic knowledge requires first-hand experience. This paper criticizes this view and argues for (...) an alternative view, according to which aesthetic discourse expresses affective states of mind, analogously to how assertions express beliefs. It is because these affective states require first-hand experience that aesthetic discourse communicates that such acquaintance is at hand. The paper furthermore argues that the lack of an experience requirement for aesthetic belief ascriptions constitutes a problem for the kind of expressivist who claims that evaluative belief states are covert non-cognitive states. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider a few actual cases of mnemonic strategies among older subjects (older than 65). The cases are taken from an ethnographic study, examining how elderly adults cope with cognitive decline. We believe that these cases illustrate that the process of remembering in many cases involve a complex distributed web of processes involving both internal or intracranial and external sources. Our cases illustrate that the nature of distributed remembering is shaped by and subordinated to the dynamic characteristics (...) of the on-going activity and to our minds suggest that research on memory and distributed cognition should focus on the process of remembering through detailed descriptions and analysis of naturally occurring situations. (shrink)

Rumfitt has given two arguments that in unilateralist verificationist theories of meaning, truth collapses into correct assertibility. In the present paper I give similar arguments that show that in unilateral falsificationist theories of meaning, falsehood collapses into correct deniability. According to bilateralism, meanings are determined by assertion and denial conditions, so the question arises whether it succumbs to similar arguments. I show that this is not the case. The final section considers the question whether a principle central to Rumfitt's first (...) argument, ‘It is assertible that if and only if it is assertible that it is assertible that ’, is one that bilateralists can reject, and concludes that they cannot. It follows that the logic of assertibility and deniability, according to a result by Williamson, is the little known modal logic K4 studied by Sobociński. The paper ends with a plaidoyer for bilateralists to adopt this logic. (shrink)